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A Reappraisalof Diversification
in theFederalCourts:
GenderEJfectsin the CourtsofAppeals
Donald R. Songer
Universityof South Carolina

Sue Davis
Universityof Delaware

Susan Haire
Universityof North Carolinaat Greensboro
Prior scholarshipon the effect of the increasingnumberof femalejudges leads to three contrasting
sets of expectations. Early writings and views of affirmative-actionactivists suggested that female
judgeswould be more liberalthan male judges.On the other hand,a seriesof empiricalstudies suggest
that we should expect no genderdifferences.In contrastto both of these perspectives,severalfeminist
scholarssuggest that women will be more liberal only when that position expresses support for full
participationin the community.These contrastingexpectationswere tested by analyzingthe votes of
appealscourt decisions in three issue areas.No differenceswere discoveredbetween male and female
judgesin obscenityor criminalsearchand seizurecases.However,in employmentdiscriminationcases,
femalejudgeswere significantlymoreliberalthan their male colleagues.

INTRODUCTION

O

nly eight women had served as federal judges before 1977 when President
Jimmy Carterinstituted a plan to diversify the federal courts.1Carter'sreforms
resultedin the appointmentof 11 women to the United States Courts of Appeals
and 29 to the federaldistrictcourts. Subsequently,PresidentsRonaldReaganand
George Bush appointeda total of six women to the Courtsof Appeals.2Although
the number of women on the federalintermediateappellatebench remainsrelatively small, that numberis large enough to make it possible, indeed, essentialto
begin to study their decisionmaking.In the presentstudy we analyzethe behavior
of judgeson the United States Courtsof Appealsto discoverwhetherdifferences
in voting behaviormay be attributedto the genderof the judge.
I See Berksonand Carbon(1980). See Martin (1982, 1987). For documentationof the underrepresentationof women on the bench, see Cook (1988).
2RonaldReaganappointedfour womenand George Bush had appointedtwo as of August 1990.
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 56, No. 2, May 1994,Pp. 425-39
C 1994by the Universityof Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819
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Male andFemaleDecisionMakers
PreviousStudiesComparing
Advocatesof diversificationof the federalbench hoped that increasingthe number of womenwould not only give qualifiedwomenprofessionalopportunitiesthat
had long been denied to them but would also enhancethe legitimacyof the judiciaryinsofaras the courts would begin more accuratelyto reflectthe composition
of the general population. Many supportersof Carter's efforts to increase the
numberof women on the federalcourts also hoped that women judges would actuallyrepresentwomen'sinterests.One scholar,for example,explainedthat, "The
organizedcampaignto place more women on the bench rests on the hope that
women judges will seize decision-makingopportunitiesto liberateother women"
(Cook 1981, 216). Critics of Carter'sselection reforms,including his two successors, expresseddisdain for the liberalactivismof the Carterappointeesand contended that they were not of the same high caliberas the judgeswho were selected
duringReagan'spresidency(Cohodas1983, 83).
Initially,a numberof socialscientistssharedthe generalexpectationthat women
on the federalbench would help to produceliberaldecisions.Kritzerand Ulhman
(1977), for example,wrotethat, "Commonsense as well as sociologicaltheorysuggests that the socializationexperiencesof men and women are significantlydifferent"(86). Those differences,combinedwith culturalnorms,they argued,should
lead to differencesin judicialbehavior.Goldman(1979) suggestedthat affirmativeactionappointmentscould be expectedto bring a heightenedsensitivityto judicial
resolutionof questionsof raceand'sexdiscrimination.3
Empiricalstudies of differencesin patternsof decision makingamong political
elites other than judges provide only weak supportfor the initial expectationsregardingfemale judges. Leader's (1977) examinationof interest group ratings of
membersof Congressled her to concludethat women were more liberalthanmen,
particularlyin the areas of social welfare and defense spending.4Welch (1985),
who analyzedConservativeCoalitionscores, found that women were more likely
than men to cast liberalvotes, but that the differenceshad decreasedover time. In
contrast,studies of the views of politicalpartyelites (Constantiniand Craik1972)
and civil servants(Thompson 1978) failed to reveal significantdifferencesbased
on the sex of the decision maker.Thomas (1987) found that women legislatorsin
Californiawere no more liberal than their male counterpartswhile Thomas and
Welch (1991) concluded that women legislatorsin 12 states were only slightly
more likely than men to give higher priorityto women's issues than to business
and commerce.
To date, systematicanalysesof judicialbehaviorhave failed to provide much
more support for the contention that women judges will differ from their male
3Additionally,Martin (1982) predicted that the women appointed by Carter would help create a
more liberaljudicialpolicy towardwomen.
4A factoranalysisof congressionalvotingfrom1961to 1975led Frankovic(1977)to similarconclusions.
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counterpartsthan the studies of other politicalelites. For example,two studies of
the sentencingpatternsof urbantrial court judges revealedno significantdifferences between males and females(Kritzerand Uhlman 1977;Gruhl, Spohn, and
Welch 1981). The results of those studies, however, may not be generalizableto
the quite different context of decision-makingby federal appellatejudges. Still,
two studies of voting behavioron the United States Courts of Appeals revealed
only slight differencesbetween men and women judges (Gottschall 1983; Davis
1986). In contrast Allen and Wall (1987), who examined the votes of judges on
four state supremecourts, found that four of the five women voted on "women's
issues" in a way that placedthem at the liberalextremeof their respectivecourts.
While Allen and Wall's (1987) study provides partialsupport for the expectation
that women judges will be more liberalthan their male colleagues,it is limited by
the small numberof women and the small numberof cases includedin the study5
and the absenceof controlsfor the partisanbackgroundof the judges.
In the most ambitiousattemptto date to determinethe effects of womenjudges,
Walker and Barrow (1985) compared the decisions of male and female judges
on the federaldistrict courts. Their results in cases involving criminalprocedure
paralleledthose of the earliersentencingstudies: there were no significantdifferences between men and women judges. Likewise, in cases that involved women's
policy issues there were no significantdifferences.In the areaof personalliberties
and minority policy issues, however, the differences between male and female
judges were statisticallysignificant.Those differences were not in the expected
direction-male judgeswereone and one-halftimes morelikelythanfemalejudges
.to supportthe liberalposition. The results also indicatedthat female judges were
significantlymore likely than their male counterpartsto defer to positions taken
by government.6As the authorsnoted, "such patternscould not have been predicted from the politicalrhetoricexpressedduringthe debateover the diversification of the federalbench"(Walkerand Barrow1985, 608).
FeministLegal Theory
The existing empiricalstudies of differencesin patternsof decisionmakingbetween male and female politicalelites provide very little support for a hypothesis
that women judges on the Courts of Appealswill be more liberalthan their male
counterparts.Still, a number of scholarshave theorized that women judges will
differ in fundamentalways from their male colleagues. Feminist legal scholars
arguethat women lawyersand judgeswill bring a differentperspectiveto the law,
employ a differentset of methods, and seek differentresults than the (male) legal
traditionwould seem to mandate.The well-knownwork of psychologistGilligan
'The numberof cases rangedfrom 10 to 14 cases for each court.
6Instill anotherstudy, Gryski,Main, and Dixon (1986) found only a weakand statisticallyinsignificant relationshipbetween the presenceof a female judge and state high court decision makingin sex
discriminationcases.
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(1982) provides some empiricalsupport for the claims that feminist legal theory
makes. Gilligan (1982) discovereddifferencesin the ways that males and females
understandthemselves and their environment,and the way they resolve moral
problems. She found that males tend to define themselves through separation,
measurethemselvesagainstan abstractideal of perfection,and equate adulthood
with autonomyand individualachievement;they conceivemoralityin hierarchical
terms-a ladder.In contrast,femalesoften define themselvesthroughconnection
with othersand activitiesof care,and perceivemoralityin termsof a web.
How might the differencesthat Gilligan (1982) found manifest themselves in
judging?Karst (1984) asserted that women's perspective would alter the male
conception of freedom that shaped the values of the Constitution.He reasoned
that principles of liberty, property, due process, and equality traditionallyhave
representedguaranteesof protectionfrom interferenceby others; they express a
desire for separationfrom governmentas individualliberties ratherthan as collective rights. But women judges could transformthose principlesby integrating
such values as connection, caring, and responsibility.Thus, the state could acquire an affirmativeduty to ensure that each of its members has the ability to
participatefully in the community. Binion (1991, 9) asserted that integrating
women's experienceinto constitutionalanalysisis likely to result in a reformulation of rights analysis to redefine liberty as more than protection from government and to reconceptualizethe nature of community. Sherry (1986) also drew
on Gilligan'sworkto identify characteristicsof what she referredto as a feminine
jurisprudence.A jurisprudencethat emphasizesconnection(in contrastto autonomy), context (as opposed to fixed rules), and responsibility(in contrastto rights)
would be feminine but, she pointed out, not necessarilyfeminist. Nor would it
necessarilybe liberalbut would "encompassaspects of personalityand relationship to the world that have nothing to do with one's politicalpreferences"(Sherry
1986, 583). Accordingto Sherry (1986), Justice SandraDay O'Connor'sdecision
making manifests a jurisprudencethat differs clearly from that of her male colleagues. O'Connor, in Sherry's assessment,has not been as willing as the other
conservativeson the Court to permit violations of the right to full membership
in the community. Moreover, she has tended to support individual rights only
when they implicate membershipin the community. O'Connor'sdecision making also has reflecteda view that shaping the values of the community through
governmentalprocessesis an importantfunction of communitymembers(Sherry
1986, 603).
It is importantto note that feministlegal theory makesno claim that the differences between men and women judges will emerge simply as liberalor conservative voting patternsacrossthe board.The theorysuggests that women judges will
be liberalinsofaras they will vote to supportclaimantswho allege discrimination
that has resulted in exclusion from full participationin the community. In contrast, women judges would be categorizedas conservativeon the basis of their
votes in cases in which individualrightsconflictwith communityinterests.
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MethodologyandFramework
We have formulatedthree alternativesets of hypothesesbased on the predictions of supportersof diversificationon the federalbench and socialscientists,empirical analyses of voting behavior, and feminist legal theory. First, the initial
predictionsabout women judges led us to hypothesizethat they will be more liberal than their male counterpartsacrossthe three issue areasthat we have included
in our analysis:search and seizure, obscenity, and employment discrimination.7
Women, the early predictionsimplied, would be more protectiveof civil liberties
becausethey are likely to have particularempathy for individualswho are disadvantaged(as women themselveshavebeen) in Americansociety.
In contrast,the empiricalstudies of voting behaviorled us to our second hypothesis: female judges will not be more liberal than their male counterpartsin
any of the three issues areas.Regardlessof the extent to which their early socializationdifferedfrom that of their male colleagues,their common socializationinto
the legal subcultureand the partisanand contextualpressuresfrom the democratic subculturewhich cut across gender lines tend to cancel out any gender-based
differences.
Feminist legal theoryprovidesthe basis for our third set of hypotheses.Women
judgeswill be more conservativein obscenitycases than their male counterpartsexplicit sexual materialsmay be viewed as perpetuatingthe oppressionof women
and as damagingto the moralfiberof the community.They will be no more likely
than their male counterpartsto support the liberal position in search and seizure cases-to support the claim of a criminaldefendantwould conflict with the
interestsof the community.Finally, women will be more liberalthan men in employment discriminationcases as women tend to emphasizerights that are interdependent, such as full membershipin the community. Discriminationmay be
viewedas a problemof exclusion.
The present study takes as its unit of analysisthe votes of all regularjudges of
the United States Courts of Appeals, including those on senior status, from the
District of ColumbiaCircuitand the 11 numberedcircuitsfrom 1981 to 1990.We
excludedfrom analysisthe votes of judgesfrom other courtswho temporarilyparticipatedon appealscourt panels. The analysisof obscenity cases is based on all
opinions published in the FederalReporterduring this period. These opinions
contained239 votes that were suitable for analysis.8Since there were more than
3,000 published opinions in the decade studied for both search and seizure and
7As noted later, fully specifiedmodels of judicialvoting behaviorrequirethe inclusion of controls
for specificcase facts and the natureof the particulartypes of litigantswho appearin court. To properly specify such case facts, narrowlydefinedcase types must be chosen for analysis.Previousworkhas
shown that obscenityand searchand seizurecases meet this criterion(see Hagle 1991;McGuire 1990;
Songerand Haire 1992;Segal 1984).
8Cases which had missing data for one or more of the variableswere excluded from the logistic
regression.
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employment discriminationcases, samples of each case type were drawn for
analysis. First, for the employment discriminationcases, a search utilizing the
WESTLAW electronicdata base identifiedthe universeof cases whose decisions
were published in the FederalReporter.From the universe of cases, a random
sample of 200 decisions was selected. But since the proportionof votes cast by
women judgesremainslow, such a samplewould producetoo few votes by women
to permit satisfactoryanalysis. Therefore, the original sample of 200 cases was
supplementedby identifying the universe of cases in which each woman judge
participatedand randomlyselecting three additionalcases from the universe of
participationsof each woman (in these three cases selected for each woman, the
votes of all judges were coded). For searchand seizurecases, a randomsampleof
40 cases per yearwhich had been drawnfor anotherprojectwas employed.These
samples yielded 1,158 votes in search and seizure cases suitable for analysisand
607 votes in employmentdiscriminationcases.9
To test our hypotheses,we coded the dependentvariable"1" for a liberalvote
and "0" for a conservativevote. Votes which could not be unambiguouslyclassified as either liberal or conservative(e.g., those to affirmin part and reverse in
part)were excluded from analysis.For obscenitycases, we adoptedthe definition
of a "liberal"vote, employedin recentempiricalstudies of the obscenitydecisions
of appellatecourts (Songer and Haire 1992; Hagle 1991; Dudley 1989). Thus, a
vote to supporta nonrestrictiveposition on the use and disseminationof allegedly
obscene materials(e.g., overturningan obscenity conviction or concludingthat a
challengedbook was not obscene) is liberal.For searchand seizure decisions, we
defineda liberalvote as one in favorof holding that a searchwas unreasonableor
that challengedevidence must not be used.10For job discriminationcases, we defined a liberalvote as one which supportedthe claimant.11
In order to assess gender-basedeffects while controllingfor a large number of
independentvariableswe employedlogit in a multivariateanalysis.Logit, which is
preferredto regressionwhen the dependentvariableis dichotomous(Aldrichand
Nelson 1984), permitsthe calculationof a maximum-likelihoodcoefficientfor the
effect that each independent variablehas on the probabilitythat the dependent
variablewill assumea specifiedvalue (in the analysisbelow, on the probabilityof a
liberalvote).
9The limitationof the analysisto publishedopinionsmeansthat some cautionmust be exercisedbefore generalizingfrom these results to all cases. It would be prohibitivelyexpensiveto samplethe unpublisheddecisionsof the courts,and we haveno way to knowfor certainwhetherthe effect of genderis
the samein publishedand unpublisheddecisions.Songer(1988, 1990)found that for otherindicatorsof
judicialvalues,the relationshipbetweenvaluesand votes wasin the samedirectionin publishedand unpublisheddecisions.Therefore,we suspectthat the effect of genderwouldbe similarin unpublisheddecisions, but the magnitudeof that effect maybe less in unpublishedthan in publisheddecisionsbecause
unpublisheddecisionsarelikelyto containfeweropportunitiesfor exerciseof judicialdiscretion.
'?That is, we adoptedthe definitionemployedby Segal (1984) but reversedthe orderof votes coded
as "1"and "O."
IIn claimsbroughtby a male challengingan affirmative-actionplan, we coded a vote in favorof the
maleplaintiffas conservative.
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We constructeda separatemodel for each of our three issue areas.A number
of studies suggest that judicialvalues reflectedin regionaldifferencesand partisan appointmentpatterns are strongly related to the votes of judges (Tate and
Handberg1991;Songerand Davis 1990;Howard1981).Therefore,for each model
we includeda measureof region(1 = South, non-South = 0) and a variableto represent presidentialappointment.The appointmentvariablewas coded "1" if the
judge was appointedby a "liberalideology consciouspresident,""-1" if appointment by a "conservativeideology conscious president"and "O"if appointedby a
president who was not ideology conscious."2We also included fact patterns of
cases and the natureof the litigantsin each model. Recent analysesof both search
and seizuredecisionsof the SupremeCourt (Segal 1984) and of the obscenitydecisions of a wide spectrumof appellatecourts (Songer and Haire 1992;McGuire
1990; Hagle 1989; Dudley 1989) suggest that differencesin the fact patternsof
cases before appellatecourts may explain a substantialportion of the variancein
the decisions of the courts and the votes of individual judges. Similarly, recent
studies (Songer and Sheehan 1992; Songer and Haire 1992;Wheeler et al. 1987)
demonstratethat the natureof the litigantsinvolved in a case affect the likelihood
of a liberal vote even after controls are introducedfor other case characteristics
and the backgroundsof judges.That is, the likelihoodthat a given judge will support the liberalposition may be significantlyaffectedby the specific case characteristics;and this effect may be independentof any gendereffects.
To identify the most importantcase characteristicsfor obscenityand searchand
seizure cases, we relied on existing models. For obscenity cases, we selected the
case characteristicsthat Songer and Haire (1992) have found to have the greatest
impacton the voting of appealscourt judges.Thus, we coded whetherthe litigant
opposing the government was an individual or a bookstore, the nature of the
allegedly obscene material,and whether the distributionof the materialwas restricted to adults. For search and seizure cases, we adapted Segal's (1984) factpatternmodel, coding case facts relatingto the locationof the search,the extent of
the search,whetherthere was a warrantor probablecause, and whetheror not any
of the exceptionsto the warrantrequirementwere present.13
12Thisclassificationof presidentsis derived from that employedby Tate and Handberg(1991). We
coded Carter,who was not included in the Handbergand Tate classification,as a liberal ideologyconsciouspresident.
'3Segal(1984) definedprobablecause and the arrestvariablesas the proportionof judgesbelow who
found that therewas probablecauseor that the arrestwas lawful. Since for our dataall casescame from
a singlejudgedecisionof the districtcourt,the valuesforthese variablescouldonly takeon the values"1"
if the district court found probablecause, etc., or "O"if the district found that there was no probable
cause. Segal's (1984) exceptionvariablewas simply the total number,out of a maximumof six that he
coded, of exceptionsthatwerepresent.While maintainingthe basicformatof the variable,we coded two
additionalexceptionsthatwererecognizedby the SupremeCourtsubsequentto the timeof Segal's(1984)
study; a good faith exception and the inevitablediscoveryexception. It is unclear from Segal (1984)
whetherthese exceptionswerecoded as presentif the SupremeCourtconcludedthat they were present
or the lowercourtsmadesuch a determination.For ourcoding,we reliedon the determinationof the districtcourt(as reportedin the appealscourt'sopinion)as to whetheror not a givenexceptionwaspresent.
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For employment discriminationcases, we constructeda model based on our
analysisof recent opinions of the Supreme Court. We focused on the findingsof
the trial court in the following areas:evidence at trial of past discrimination,the
nature of the alleged discrimination,effect on seniorityrights, and the nature of
the relief sought. To this fact-patternmodel, we added the variablesfor region
and presidentialappointmentused in the models of search and seizure and obscenity decisions.Finally, to assess the effects of litigantstatus,we includedan indicationof whetherthe plaintiffwas identifiablypoor and whether the defendant
was either a businessor a government.
In summary,each of the three models includesidenticalmeasuresof region,the
appointingpresidentof each judge who participatedon the panel, and the gender
of each judge. The models also contain variableswhich attempt to tap the most
relevantcase characteristicsfor each of the three areasof law investigated.Since
statutes and precedentsin these three areasare different,the case characteristics
included in the three models are necessarilydifferent.As a result, the models are
not identical.Due to this use of partiallydifferentmodels for the three issue areas,
some caution is necessarywhen interpretingthe relativeimpact of gender in the
three areas. Unfortunately,there appearsto be no way around this dilemma. If
case facts were omitted from the models in order to produceidenticalmodels for
each issue area, the models would be seriously underspecifiedand any relationships discoveredbetween gender and judicialvoting decisionsmight be spurious.
Results
We examined the impact of gender on judges' behaviorseparatelyin each of
three categoriesof cases with controlsfor case factsas well as regionand presidential appointment.The model for judges' votes in obscenity cases is presentedin
table 1.
The model does a very good job of predictingthe votes of the judges. Overall,
the model correctlypredicts 86.2% of the judges' votes in the universe of published obscenitydecisionsthat we examined,a reductionin errorof 53.2%.14Both
the presidentialappointmentvariableand region were significantpredictorsof
judges'votes. Additionally,the type of litigantand variouscase facts provedto be
important.However, as table 1 shows, the genderof the judge appearsto have no
effect on the likelihoodof a liberalvote when other factorsare takeninto account.
The coefficientfor genderis smalland statisticallyinsignificant.Moreover,the addition of gender to the model adds nothing to the predictivepower of the model.
'4The reduction-in-errorfigureis a measureof the improvementin the predictionof the valuesof the
dependentvariablethatis providedby the modelcomparedto the predictionsthatwouldbe madeby the
naive strategyof predictingthat the value for every case was the value reflectedby the modal value of
the dependentvariable.It is the proportionof the errormade in the naive predictionthat is eliminated
by the model. A commonlyacceptedformulaforcomputationof the reductionin error(ROE)is: ROE =
100(% correctlyclassified- % in the modalcategory)/ (100%- % in the modalcategory).
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TABLE 1
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LIBERAL VOTE
OBSCENITY CASES,
IndependentVariables
Intercept
Region
Appt. pres.
Bookstore
Individual
Film
Prior
Adult
Magazine
Judge gender

1981-1990

MLE

SE

-4.672
1.240
1.118
3.892
-1.885
-1.408
1.592
3.958
-1.503
-0.709

0.52**
0.26***
0.96***
0.56***
0.49**
0.58***
1.10***
0.51**
0.85

% Categorizedcorrectly- 86.2% (falsepositive = 20.0%;falsenegative= 11.6%).
Reductionin error= 53.2%.
-2 x LLR = 144.92.
Model chi square= 109.93,df = 9, p < .0001.
Number of cases = 210, meanof dependentvariable= .295.
significantat .05; "significantat .01; ***significantat .001.

When the model was re-run without the variablefor gender, the percentageof
votes categorizedcorrectlyand the reductionin errorwere preciselythe same as
before. Therefore, no gender-baseddifferencesappearto exist in the voting behaviorof judgesin obscenitycases.
The effect of judges'genderon votes in searchand seizurecases is presentedin
table 2. The model is statisticallysignificantand successful in predictingalmost
90.0% of the votes. In general,the results are consistentwith Segal's (1984) findings for the Supreme Court. The case facts that had the biggest impact on the
probabilityof a liberal vote were the existence of a search warrant,a finding of
probablecause by the trialcourt, or a trialcourt findingthat one or more generally
recognizedexceptionsto the warrantrequirementexisted.
Once again,the additionof the genderof judgesto the model has no discernible
effect. The coefficientfor genderis small and does not approachstatisticalsignificance. Moreover,when the model was re-run without a variablefor the genderof
the judges, there was no reductionin the predictiveaccuracyof the model. Thus,
it appearsthat the genderof a judge is unrelatedto voting behaviorin searchand
seizurecases.15
'50ne initiallytroublingaspectof the model displayedin table2 is that thereappearsto be very little
reductionin errorover the accuracythat could be obtainedby predictingthat every vote would be conservative.Thus, some cautionis necessarywhen generalizingabout gender effects from these results.
The failureof the model to producea reductionin errorappearsto be due to the extremeskew of the
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TABLE

2

LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LIBERAL VOTE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES, 1981-1990
IndependentVariables

MLE

Intercept

- 1.390

Region
Appt. pres.
Home
Business
Extent
ProbCaus
Warrant
Except
Judge gender

-0.107
0.365
0.162
0.532
0.176
-0.571
-0.793
-0.953
-0.136

SE
0.22
0.12**
0.25
0.34
0.33
0.24**
0.29**
0.21***
0.35

% Categorizedcorrectly= 89.4% (falsepositive = 10.6%;false negative= 0.0%).
Reductionin error= 0%.
-2 x LLR = 625.32.
Model chi square= 45.21, df= 9, p < .0001.
Number of cases = 994, meanof dependentvariable= .105.
significantat .05; "significantat .01; ***significantat .001.

The results of the test of the effects of gender on employmentdiscrimination
cases are displayedin table 3. The model is successfulin predicting70.9% of the
votes and producesa reductionin error of 40.7%. As expected, presidentialappointmenteffects are strong.Moreover,severalcase facts and litigantcharacteristics significantlyaffectthe probabilityof a liberalvote.
Further examinationof table 3 reveals that, in sharp contrastto the results in
obscenity and search and seizure cases, the coefficientfor gender is positive, robust, and statisticallysignificant.Thus, it appearsthat the gender of the judge is
stronglyrelatedto the probabilityof a liberalvote in job discriminationcases.
Having establishedthat judges' gender has a statisticallysignificantimpact on
their votes, we now ask, in probabilisticterms, what is the magnitudeof this effect
after the model has controlledfor the effects of case facts, litigant characteristics,
and presidentialappointment?To answer this question, we computed the estimatedprobabilityof a liberalvote for male judges and for femalejudgesusing the
dependent variable(89% of the votes uphold the validityof the search).To provideat least a partial
test of this hunch, we adoptedthe strategyutilized by Songer and Sheehan(1992, 249). We selected a
new samplewith a dependentvariablethat was not skewedby combiningall of the liberalvotes with a
random 11% sample of the conservativevotes. The model was then re-run on this new sample. The
model for this new sample correctly predicted 66.7% of the votes and had a reduction in error of
32.3%.Judge genderin this new model still had little impact(MLE = -0.12), was statisticallyinsignificant, and increasedneitherthe proportionof votes categorizedcorrectlynor the reductionin error.
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TABLE

3

LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LIBERAL VOTE
JOB DISCRIMINATION CASES, 1981-1990
IndependentVariables
Intercept
Region
Appt. pres.
Amicus
Poor
Govt defend
Business
RaceDis
Handicap
SexDis
PastDis
Evidence
Seniority
Prefer
Judge gender

MLE

SE

-3.136
0.081
0.570
2.539
-1.058
2.328
2.423
0.781
-1.335
1.714
2.601
0.771
-2.405
0.931
0.758

0.25
0.12***
0.65***
0.53*
0.71***
0.70***
0.27**
0.55*
0.38***
0.84**
0.26**
0.90"
0.89
0.34*

% Categorizedcorrectly= 70.9% (falsepositive = 29.2%;falsenegative= 29.0%).
Reductionin error= 40.7%.
-2 x LLR = 453.24.
Model chi square= 127.50,df = 16,p < .0001.
Number of cases = 419, meanof dependentvariable= .491.
*significantat .05; **significantat .01; ***significantat .001.

MLE coefficientsfor each of the other independentvariablesreportedin table 3
togetherwith the mean values of those variables.When the values of all the other
independentvariablesare set at their mean, the probabilitythat a male judge will
cast a liberalvote is 38% while the estimatedprobabilityof a liberalvote by a female judgeis 75%. Thus, the impactof genderappearsto be quite substantial.
Finally,we sought to determinewhetherthe greaterpropensityof femalejudges
to cast liberalvotes was due to greatersympathyfor the victimsof genderdiscrimination (as expected by political activists) or whether it reflecteda more general
orientationtowardequalprotection.To obtaina roughanswerto this question,we
conducted two supplementalanalyses. First, we re-ran the model described in
table 3 for the subset of cases that did not raise any gender discriminationclaims
(e.g., racediscriminationcases).The resultssuggest that gender-baseddifferences
among judges persist even in cases involving allegationsof employmentdiscriminationnot relatedto sex. Overall,the model for nongendercases is very similarto
that for the largersampleof all employmentdiscriminationcases. The model predicts 71.8% of the votes correctly,with a reductionin errorof 36.9%, nearlyidentical to the results for the full sample of discriminationcases. More importantly,
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genderof the judgecontinuedto be stronglyrelatedto judicialvotes, with a coefficient of 0.692, significantat the .051 level and only slightly smallerin magnitude
than the coefficientfor genderin the model for all discriminationcases.
As a second test of whether the greaterliberalismof female judges was primarily due to sympathyfor the victims of gender discrimination,we re-ran the
model presentedin table 3 with the additionof a multiplicativeterm for the interaction between gender of the judge and the variable"sex discrimination."In this
revisedmodel, both the genderof the judgeand type of case (sex discriminationor
other types of discrimination)remainstatisticallysignificantand of approximately
the same magnitudeas they were in the model presentedin table 3.16But the interactionbetween the two variablesis very small17and statisticallyinsignificant.
This suggests that whetherthe case involves gender discriminationor some other
type of discriminationdoes not affect the greaterpropensityof female than male
judgesto cast a liberalvote.
DISCUSSION

The results of our analysisof obscenity and search and seizure cases suggest
that there are no differencesin the voting behaviorof male and femalejudges. In
employmentdiscriminationcases, however, our results were quite different.Female judgeswere more likely than their male colleaguesto supportthe allegedvictim of discrimination.In sum, our analysis indicates that the introduction of
women judges to the federalappellatebench has had a substantialimpacton decision making in employment discriminationcases but no measurableeffect on
searchand seizureand obscenitycases. Clearly,the effect of genderon judicialbehavior varies with the context of the decision-makingprocess. This finding does
not supportthe sets of hypothesesderivedeither from the expectationsof the activists or from the earlierempiricalanalyses.
Among the alternativesets of hypotheses, only feminist legal theory recognizes that the behaviorof women judgeswould not be confinedto a single liberalconservativedimensionacrossissue areas.Althoughthe resultsdid not completely
support the theoreticalexpectationsassociatedwith feminist jurisprudence,the
analysissuggeststhat women judgeswill speakin a "differentvoice"when dealing
with claims of discrimination.It is possible that the socializationof women who
attend law school and pursue legal careersthat culminatein federaljudicial appointmentssubvertstendenciesto expressconcernsfor relationshipsand community ratherthan autonomyand individualrights.But that socialization,effectiveas
it may be in thoroughlygroundinglawyersin establishedmethodsof legal reasoning, may not be strong enough to overcomethe concern women have for people
16TheMLE for gender of judge increasesslightly to 0.783, significantto the .05 level, while the
MLE for sex discriminationincreasesto 1.903, significantat .001.
17MLE = 0.011, standarderror= 0.828.
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who have been targets of discriminationwhen their claims raise the interdependent right to full membershipin the community.
Alternatively,it is possible that women judges do not bring a distinct perspective to judging.If so, the differenceswe found in voting patternsbetween women
and men in employmentdiscriminationcases may simply be a result of women
judges' identificationwith other victims of discrimination.Thus, women judges'
support for claimantsin employment discriminationcases may simply reflect a
concern for protectingindividualrights in an areaof particularsalience to them,
ratherthan a concernfor connection,context, and responsibility.
The results of our analysisshould be interpretedwith caution.This study was
confinedto three narrowlydefined issue areas.Moreover,the need to control explicitly for case content led us to develop models that contain different variables
associatedwith the specific policy areas. Nevertheless, the results of this study,
and other empiricalanalyses, representa starting point for researchon women
judges. Women judges in significantnumbersare so new to the legal system that,
although it is now possible to begin to study their decision making, it is not yet
within our reach to assess the extent of their impact with certainty. In time, as
more womenassumepositionson the federalcourtsand as the decisionsof women
who are currentlyserving continue to accumulate,further researchthat reaches
firm conclusionswill become feasible.Such researchmust include analysisof voting behaviorand judicialreasoningas well as the careerpatternsand socialization
of womenjudges.
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